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The problem of designing a secure electricity supply network at minimal cost is formulated as a 
mathematical program. It is also shown how computationally convenient new constraints may be 
derived and these are added to the original set. The problem is dualized and solved approxima- 
tely. It is indicated how this approach can be built into a Branch-and-Bound scheme for solving 
the original design problem, and an illustrative example is given. 
The electricity transmission and distribution system in England is constantly 
being extended to meet increasing consumer demand [l] and the problem arises of 
finding a ‘satisfactory’ system of minimum cost. In 1972 Boardman and Hogg [l] 
noted that this was “largely achieved by trial-and-error techniques, the system 
designer having to rely on his expertise and experience”. Since that time several 
heuristic methods and interactive methods have been devised but except for very 
small problems, exact methods have not been applied successfully. 
Several load substations L 1, Lz, . . . , L, which may receive power from supply sub- 
stations Sn+lr . . ..S.+, are given. Power lines may be placed between any supply 
substation and any load substation, and between any pair of load substations. 
Between specified substations, ‘distance’ dG apart, there may be zij = 0, 1, . . .,p lines 
incurring a cost c(zU)d,. Clearly c(0) = 0 and there may be economies of scale with 
c(zij) < c(u)zij/u for 1 5 u < zij . 
Each load substation L; has a power requirement Oi which must be met. For each 
set XC {L, , . . . . L,} there is a power requirement w = a(X) = C L,Exwj and, taking 
account of possible fluctuation in demand, this necessitates I(w) power lines to be 
incoming to X for security. (As a safeguard against the possibility of a line failure 
one may insist that f(w) L 2, o > 0.) 
Thus I, which is a step function, might be expected to show an element of ‘conca- 
vity’ in that the gaps w,, , - o, (0, > 0) between successive jumps of 1 in I might be 
expected to increase (see Fig. 1 and [4]). 
ESP 
n n+m 
minimise v(z) = + c c duc(zij), 
,=I j=1 
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Fig. 1. Typical form of the security function 1 
subject to c zUrl(o(T)) YT~{1,2,...,n}, (1) 
ler 
J6T 
Zi, =Zji, (2) 
ZijE (0, L...,P) (3) 
(Note that we have modified the notation somewhat. From now on the load sub- 
stations L, will usually be denoted simply by i. Similarly Sj will be replaced by j.) 
This deceptively simple looking problem, is made difficult by the forms of the 
functions c and I. Indeed the problem can be seen to be difficult, in the theoretical 
sense of being NP-hard, by noting that any Euclidean Travelling Salesman Problem 
(TSP) can be represented as a special case of ESP (with m = 1, p = 1 and o(T) = 2 
VT). However, methods have been devised for solving quite large TSPs and the 
approach of the present paper bears some similarity to that adopted by Miliotis [6] 
in the context of TSPs. 
In this paper we shall be concerned with the special case in which p=2 and 
c(2)/c( 1) = K = : which is appropriate if underground cables are being used [4]. This 
particular form of ESP is reformulated in Section 1. In section 2 a scheme for 
deriving appropriate new security constraints is described and in Section 3 a scheme 
for obtaining reasonably tight lower bounds is proposed. This allows error bounds 
to be determined on results obtained by heuristic methods, can provide feasible 
solutions as a ‘byproduct’, and provides a basis for the application of a Branch-and- 
Bound method if so desired. A numerical example is discussed in Section 4. The 
final section provides a discussion of the approach and gives some tentative conclu- 
sions. 
1. Brief review of earlier work 
Since we shall be allowing at most two lines per right-of-way @=2) it is conve- 
nient to introduce binary variables xij and yij where xij specifies if the ‘first’ line 
between i and j is to be constructed and yti specifies if the ‘second’ line is to be con- 
structed. ESP can now be reformulated as 
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minimise I+, u) = 3 C C d&X;;+ +_Yij), 
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There are 2” - 1 constraints implied by (5) and, not surprisingly, a direct appli- 
cation of integer programming methods is unwieldly and is impractical for all but 
the smallest problems, say with n< 10 (see Cory [3]). Consequently heuristic 
methods have been developed. 
In a pioneering paper Burstall [2] used a cost function, relating to overhead lines, 
in which the lst, 3rd, 5th... lines had the same cost C and the 2nd, 4th... all had the 
same cost KC with O<K 5 1. An improvement heuristic was devised with, at each 
step, one or two lines being added to the network then excess lines being removed. 
Security checking was performed exactly and problems with n+m up to 16 were 
studied. (The problem of Section 4 is from Burstall [2] but with our cost function 
used.) 
Richards and Boardman [7] in their minimax algorithm started with a feasible 
solution in which security was assured by connecting load substations directly to 
supply substations in a minimal cost way. If there is no path between load substa- 
tions i and j which does not pass through a supply substations then a single line 
between i and j may be added provided loss of security cannot be detected when a 
single line from i and/or j to a supply substation is/are removed; the net cost is rij. 
That change for which riJ is maximal is chosen and performed before going to the 
next step. Final security is not guaranteed. 
Green and Boardman [4] took this approach further with a more stringent 
security test at each step and a final complete security check. A set V of connected 
load substations is a weakest set containing i if i E VC { 1, . . . , n} and 
,~v(Xij+Ylj)P /(O(V) 
JBV 
is minimal. When the addition of a line between load substations i and j is being 
considered the security of the weakest sets containing i and j are tested. The method 
was quite quick requiring only a few seconds processing time on an ICL 1906s com- 
puter for the problem of Section 4 and generally seems to lead to high quality solu- 
tions - some justification for this is provided in Section 4. 
Finally mention may be made of the maximin constructive method of Richards 
and Boardman [7]. The network is built up such that at any step the line added is to 
a subset of load substations for which the minimal cost of attaining security is a 
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maximum. Since only a selection of subsets of load substations is considered, ulti- 
mate security is not guaranteed. 
Generally, difficulty has been experienced with guaranteeing security. Often the 
security checks are heuristic and some authors have relied on statistical sampling. 
However, the assumption that I is concave means that 
f(o(A UB)) I I(o(A)) + f(w(B)) (9) 
if A OB = 0. Thus each component of the network that results from deleting supply 
substations can be tested separately this often leading to a considerable saving in 
computational effort. 
Exact solution methods have been successfully applied to only very small 
problems. Heuristically obtained solutions are available for larger (though still fair- 
ly small) problems; the quality of these solutions is not known for certain and we 
look in the next two sections at how the possible error may be bounded by obtaining 
lower bounds to ESP’. 
2. Obtaining lower bounds for ESP 
As noted earlier, computational difficulties are experienced in guaranteeing secu- 
rity as expressed by the large number of constraints in (5). Consequently in looking 
for lower bounds, we would like to reduce the number of these security constraints 
to some small set which is critical in determining an optimal solution. Because of the 
concavity of the function I the constraints of (5) with T containing one (or only a 
few) elements are in a sense ‘tighter’ than those for which T contains a larger 
number of elements. Thus we seek constraints based on small T. The following 
theorems allow appropriate derived constraints to be formed for T containing more 
than a single element. 
Theorem 1. If ITI >l, then 
(10) 
where zli is written in place of x~ +yij and t(T) in place of I(w(T)) (the Total number 
of incoming lines required by the set T). Also r(T) = t(T), by definition, for single- 
ton sets T. ( [<l denotes the ‘smallest integer not less than r.) 
Proof. See appendix. 
Corollary. If ) T 1 > 1, then 
r m(T- {W+f(T)~ 
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where f(T) = r+t(T)l is the number of ‘first’ lines (i.e. first-laid with respect o 
pairs i, j of substations) required by set T andd(T) = f (T), by definition, for single- 
ton sets T. 
Example 1. Consider the network with four load stations 1,2,3,4 whose require- 
ments are 
W({ 1)) = 0.9, w((2})= 1.3, 0({3})= 1.5, w({4})= 1.2 
and suppose the function I is specified by Table 1. (Note that this function is not 
quite concave in the sense used earlier. Meckiff et al. [5] using statistical principles 
derived a security function which is truly concave. However, for purposes of 
comparison we have preferred to use the form of Table 1 which has been much used 
[1,2,4,7]. Note also that, in general, the security of larger sets Tmust be tested as the 
security of subsets of T may be satisfied only with the aid of inter-load substation 
lines.) 
Table I 
Security function I(w) 
No. of lines 2 3 4 5 6 I 8 9 10 
Requirement met 1.0 1.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.5 5.0 6.0 7.0 
No. of lines 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Requirement met 1.5 8.5 9.5 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 16.0 
Solution. Clearly, from Table 1, 
Then 
t({1))=2, f({2}) = 3, [({3))=3, f({4}) = 3, 
t({l,2})=l(o({1,2}))=f(cu{l}+w{2})=1(2.2)=4, 
t((1,3))=4, f({2,3]) = 5, t({l,2,3})=7, etc. 
i(]1,2])= rt(T({l))+i({2})+t({1,2)))1 = r+(2+3+4)1 =5, 
F({1,3))=5, %2,3))=6, 
W,2,3))= r~(~({l,2})+~((l,3))+i({2,3})+t({l,2,3}))1 
= r+(5+5+6+7)1 =8. 
Further results are given in Table 2. 
The last three columns of Table 2 require explanation. The notation [2,4] is used 
to indicate that substations 2 and 4 are to be regarded as forming a single composite 
substation and in this context a line from 2 to 4 is irrelevant. 
It may be observed that, for the tabulated values, t(T) (F(T)5 C iC rt((i}); the 
following theorem shows this to be true generally. 
Theorem 2. Suppose t is an increasing function such that t(A U B) 5 t(A) + t(B) for 
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Table 2 
T (11 121 131 (41 {1,2} {1,3} {1,4) (273) {2,41 {3,41 
w(T) 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.2 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.8 2.5 2.1 
f(T) 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 
TV) 2 3 3 3 5 5 5 6 5 6 
f(T) 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 
f(T) 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 4 “. 
T {1,2,3} {L2,4} {L3,4) {2.3,4) {1,2,3,4} {[2,41,1} {[2,41,3) {IL4l,L31 
w(T) 3.1 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.9 3.4 4.0 4.9 
r(T) I 6 7 7 8 6 7 8 
F(T) 8 7 8 8 10 I 7 9 
f(T) 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 
J(T) 5 4 5 5 6 4 4 5 
A and B disjoint. Then, if 1 T 1 > 1 
(9 
1 
t(T)s(iT, -1) ,t~ (c t(T- Ii))), 
(ii) t(T) 5 F(T) 5 ,~TW)). 
Proof. A proof by induction is fairly straightforward and will not be given. 
Corollary. Analogous results hold for the function f. 
3. Lower bounds for ESP 
ESP’ of (4)-(g) has now been relaxed to 
” n+m 
ESP” minimise q(x, y) = + c c d;Jx,j+ +y;vij), 
I=1 J=i 
subject toxUryii vi,j (@ijX 
4, =x,, vi,j (e;)> 
Yij=Yji vi,j (W> 
XijtYfjE {Q1} K,j 
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(PT) 
(Note that some of the constraints may refer to sets containing composite sub- 
stations obtained by ‘coalescing’ several load substations. Note also that Xii and _Yii 
are to be taken as zero in the summations.) 
ESP is now further relaxed to ESP@, . . . . 1, ,D, 1, p) by incorporating all constraints, 
other than (1 l), into the objective with multipliers indicated above. 
ESP(e, . . ..~.K&P) 
minimise lo= C {t(T)~T+f(T)rur+~(oX~+tf(T)PT} 
” n+m 
where 
subject to xij, yije (0, l} 
Aii=tdi,-@ij-(~-~)-~T-~T-XT-PT, 
B~=~d,j+@ij-(8~-8~)-~T-X,. 
Now much use of the constraint xij?yij has been made through introduction of the 
constraints involvingf(T) andy(T), and we will set e = 0. At any stage BX and @’ will 
be assumed chosen so that 
A,l=Ajb Bo=B;i if 1 Ii,jsn, 
A,=B,=O if i>n, jln. 
We choose p = +z corresponding to the different coefficients of the do terms in Aij 
and B,. Finally, since composite load substations are allowed the AT and r((r con- 
straints are redundant and so we set i =,u = 0.) 
With these simplifications the solution to ESP(Q, . ..) becomes 
where Ti(T) has been written in place of T(T) + if(T). 
As usual we would like to find an optimal or near optimal solution to 
maximise @(II), 
subject to L-r0 
in order to obtain a lower bound to ESP”. 
Example 2. Obtain a good lower bound for ESP” on the network, with four load 
substations 1, 2, 3 and 4 and two supply substations 5 and 6, whose distance matrix 
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is given by 
+(d,) = 
. 14 11 17 9 18 
14 l 16 5 11 16 
11 16 l 16 18 9 
17 5 16 l 16 13 
9 11 18 16 l l 
18 16 913 l l 









. 36 18 
17 5 16 l 32 26 I , 
the last two rows being omitted as they are now superfluous. Set 
T’-(4), Lre4, Q&0+(4)4= 16, 
i 
. 14 11 15 18 36 
B+ 
14 l 16 3 22 32 
11 16 l 14 36 18 
15 3 14 l 28 22 1 . 
(Notice now the left hand submatrix is kept symmetric.) 
T-(1,2,3,4}, X+6, @+16+(13)6=94, 
B+- I 
. 11 8 12 12 30 
11 l 13 0 16 26 
8 13 l 11 30 12 
12 0 11 l 22 16 1 . 
~+{12,41,1,3), Jr& 16, @+94+(11+)16-;(-4-4)=258, 
i 
. 304 -4 14 
B+- 30 50 
05* 3 
4 0 3 l 
(Note that the negative term arises since B1, = Bj6 = - 4.) 
It is readily checked that the solution in which for i<j all variables are zero except 
x159Yls; X259 Y25i x36, Y36; x46, Y46 ; x13; x24 9 
is secure. (This solution is formed by allowing xii Qij) to be nonzero only if B;j 5 0). 
Design of elecfricity supply networks 33 
Since the value of this solution is 
equal to the lower bound above, it must be optimal. 
The solution, and its relationship to the bounding process are illustrated in Fig. 2. 
Fig. 2. The requirement wi is shown beside each load substation i. Contributions made by dual variables 
1~ for T equal to {4}, {1,2,3,4} and {[2,4],1,3} are shown by straight, wavy and broken lines 
respectively. The double lines correspond to the fact that load substation - supply substation distance is 
‘used up at twice the rate’ (see choice of variables 0x, BY). The protuding lines from 5 and 6 correspond to 
the ‘correction terms’ min(0, B,) in the expression for @(I). 
4. A larger example 
Fig. 3 represents a secure network for the problem for which the distance matrix 
(d,) is given in Table 3, the load requirements are as given in Table 4 and the func- 
tion I is as specified in Table 1. This problem which is taken from Green and Board- 
man [4] is a modified version of one given by Burstall [2]. The solution given, of 
value 242+, is the one obtained by the method of Green and Boardman - it is in fact 
optimal as will be shown below. 
A bound @(;i) was found by hand calculation using sets Tcontaining up to 4 load 
substations (though the possibility of some of these being composite substations was 
permitted.) Values for XT were determined by ‘informed judgement’ and so it is 
likely that the maximum value of @(A) would not be found even for the restricted 
range of T considered. In fact the best bound obtained using the above approach 
was some way short of 242$ and so it was decided to use Branch-and-Bound. 
Branching is on a selected pair of load substations i and j according as there are 
none, one or two lines between i and j. In each case dij, and hence B, is set to 
infinity. For exclusion nothing more is necessary. For inclusion of one (two) lines, 
d, (id;j) is added to the objective and t(T), T(T) and f(T) all reduced by 1 (2) for 
each set T which contains one but not both of i and j. 
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Fig. 3. Optimal solution for the ISsubstation problem. 
Table 3 
Distances matrix for 15-substation problem 
L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 SIO Sll S12 S13 s14 Sl5 
L1 11 23 35 31 32 36 41 42 23 18 10 27 
L2 33 43 25 36 35 36 40 25 29 17 18 
L3 16 39 23 36 48 40 22 7 17 42 
L4 40 17 32 47 34 23 23 26 47 
L5 25 14 11 17 17 40 25 13 
L6 15 30 18 11 29 22 34 
L7 16 5 15 40 28 26 
L8 16 26 51 35 20 
L9 20 45 33 30 
Table 4 










L Ll L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 Ll L8 L9 
Requirements 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.4 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.2 
The first branching (Fig. 4) was on L4L6. (L4 and L6 are relatively close but L4L6 
seems unlikely to appear in an optimal solution; without restriction Bd6 is likely to 
become negative.) It was found that two lines between L4 and L5 could not appear in 
an optimal solution but otherwise the situation was unresolved. Further branching, 
on L, L3 did resolve the situation and it was found that the solution of Fig. 3 is opti- 
mal. 
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Fig. 4. Branch-and-Bound search tree for the lkubstation problem. 
Table 5 
Bound when L4L6 and LlL3 are excluded 
Set T Amount LT Rate h(T) 
(x3) 
(91 4 4 
{5,7,8,9) 6 13 
{ [6,7,91,5,8} 10 15.5 
(1.2.5.8) 6 13 
(1.21 12 6.5 
(1>2,13,41) 2 11.5 
{[L4,L41) 12 10 
{1,2,6} 2 10.5 
{4) 26 4 
(61 14 4 
(6, [4,7,91} 6 13 
Sum of negative elements of B = - 32. 
Bound = $(807 - i(32)) = 242+. 















Values of the dual variables giving a lower bound of 242; (the optimal value) 
given for the case when L4L6 and L, L, are excluded is given in Table 5. 
5. Discussion 
Problems of the size of the one in figure 3 have been solved heuristically in a few 
seconds computing time on an ICL 1906s computer using the Green and Boardman 
method [4]. However, as observed earlier, exact methods have previously only been 
successful for smaller problems. In Sections 2 and 3 a (lower) bounding scheme was 
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suggested and Section 4 indicates how this might be incorporated into a viable 
Branch and Bound scheme providing an exact method. 
There are of course several points which need to be considered further in order to 
provide a practicable method. Firstly how are the dual variables LT to be selected? 
An attractive possibility is to approximate max @(II) by using subgradient optimiza- 
tion provided a relatively small class of appropriate sets T has been identified. This 
class could be predetermined or built up by a ‘column generation’ scheme. Another 
approach would be to allow the computer to perform optimizations and the pro- 
blem-solver interactively to provide sets T making use of geometric intuition. If 
Branch-and-Bound is being employed then there is the question of how suitable 
branching variables are to be chosen. Finally, there is the combinatorial problem of 
testing for security. We have given this little attention above, but it may be observed 
that with careful programming this should not cause difficulty for problems of a 
size encountered in practice. 
These points will be the subject of further investigation. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1. First consider T= {a, b} consisting of two elements. Then the 
following security constraints must hold (where zij is written in place of x0 +y,-): 
zlltl+ c zl7, 2 t({a>), 
Jfb 
Zba + j;ozb, z t({b}h 
c zaj+,~o~bj~r({a~b~)~ 
Ifb 
These may be added to obtain 
(Zab+zba)+2 ,~bzojfJ~uZbj rt({~}>+t({b})+r({a,b)). 
> 





2 r Hf({a)) + t({bl) + aa, bI))l (12) Jfb J*a 
which is just the required result with T= {a,b} since t((i})= i({i}). Suppose now 
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that 1 T / =p, and that the desired result holds if 1 T 1 =p- 122, then for T- {a}, 
each ae T, we have 
t,,E~IO~~i~+ ,F~/yIz;ll~~(T- {a>), 
a$ rm (0) 
that is 
(13) 
As a varies over T any element +zij, i,je T, will appear in the first term of (13) in 
(p - 2) cases (when a f i,j), and Z,j will appear just once in the second term of (13). 
Thus the sum over a of the first two terms of (13) is 
(14) 
Summing the third terms of (13) gives 
c c Gu=(P- l),ETz,,. 
oe7 lET~{U} 
a67 CZtfT 





Adding (16) to the sum of inequalities (13) and using (14) and (15) yields 
roFTfCT- {a3)+t(T) 
a~ T 
Since zij = zji dividing (17) by p leads to the desired result. 
(17) 
Proof of the Corollary. Since xijzYij it follows that 
,;, xij 2 ,;, Yij and Cxijz r+Cy,l 
where the summations are over the same, but arbitrary, index set. The desired result 
follows by analogy with the proof of the main theorem. 
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